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Frequency-Modulated Continuous-Wave (FMCW) radar is a type of Low Probability of 
Intercept radar system that is being heavily investigated in the military. Not only is its 
transmission difficult to be detected by enemy intercept receivers, but FMCW radar has 
the inherent capability of increasing coherent signal power while suppressing noise 
power during its receive signal processing. This thesis investigates the jamming 
effectiveness of selected jamming waveforms by injecting the interfering signals into the 
Lab-Volt Radar Training System (LVRTS). The jamming effect is evaluated based on the 
change in beat frequency due to the jamming. Due to the hardware limitations of the 
LVRTS, a MATLAB simulation model is also constructed for advanced electronic attack 
testing. The MATLAB model emulates the FMCW emitter digital signal processing 
response to coherent and non-coherent jamming signals under an anti-ship capable 
missile scenario. The simulation output is the target range and range rate, whose error 
measures quantify the jamming effectiveness. From the standpoint of electronic warfare, 
related subjects such as electronic warfare support measures and FMCW electronic 
protection are also discussed. 
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Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) radar is the trend of modern radar systems and 
has been proven effective in modern electronic warfare (EW) operations. Because of its 
low power, wide bandwidth, frequency variability features, LPI radar is difficult to detect 
by means of a passive non-cooperative intercept receiver. Among the many variations of 
LPI radar systems, Frequency-Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar has not only 
the ability to avoid detection, but also the inherent resistance to electronic attack (EA) 
once transmission is detected. Although highly capable, FMCW has a relatively simple 
structure, which makes it highly applicable for many modern radar systems. Such 
features attract much interest in FMCW radar, which has become the trend of modern 
radar development. 
FMCW radar is problematic to the enemy in EW due to the fact that its coherent 
nature and signal processing architecture gives significant processing gain to the radar 
echo signal, while discriminating non-coherent signals. These features allow the radar 
transmitter to operate at very low power and avoid interception by enemy electronic 
support (ES) receivers, and it also suppresses noise and jamming signals. Furthermore, its 
wideband transmission and power management system gives an additional advantage to 
FMCW radar against non-cooperative intercept receiver, as it is difficult to be aware of 
the presence of LPI signal in the radio spectrum among the noise and clutter. 
Considering the effectiveness of FMCW radar, jamming techniques that are 
capable of interfering with FMCW radar have become a subject of high interest. The goal 
of this research is to evaluate the effectiveness of selected jamming techniques against 
FMCW radar systems by looking into FMCW signal processing techniques, against 
which possible jamming techniques are investigated. The research focuses on the 
jamming phase of EW operation, with extended discussion of detection of LPI radars and 
possible electronic protection (EP) mechanisms that may be implemented in the FMCW 
emitter. The research questions can be summarized as: 
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• Primary Question:  
• What are some of the effective jamming techniques against 
FMCW? 
• Subsidiary Questions: 
• What makes FMCW radar jamming-resistant?   
• What are the ways to increase Jammer-to-Signal Ratio (JSR) at the 
radar receiver?  
• How can the simulation results be implemented in a real-world EW 
scenario? 
The research includes experiments using the Lab-Volt Radar Training System 
(LVRTS) as well as MATLAB simulation. LVRTS is a compact radar system that can be 
configured as FMCW radar and is suitable for operation in a laboratory environment. 
Using an arbitrary waveform generator, several jamming waveforms can be generated 
and applied to the LVRTS receiving antenna. The effectiveness of the jamming 
waveforms is evaluated by observing their influences on the signal beat frequency. The 
computer simulation is a separate experiment, which includes several MATLAB models 
that emulate an EW scenario. The radar model reconstructs a typical homodyne FMCW 
radar signal-processing algorithm. By applying different computer-generated jamming 
waveforms, the effect of the EA can be visualized in the radar spectrum, and the 
effectiveness of the EA techniques can be evaluated.   
B. LITERATURE REVIEW  
FMCW radar jamming has been briefly discussed in many articles and studies.  
In [1] it is stated that if the modulation period and modulation bandwidth can be 
determined, then coherent deception jamming is feasible and very effective. 
Reference [2] suggests that there are two basic approaches for jamming FMCW 
radar systems. One approach is to predict the frequency-versus-time characteristics of the 
signal and use a jammer that will input energy to the receiver at the same frequency as 
the FM signal that it is attempting to receive. This strategy allows the maximum JSR to 
be achieved for any given jammer power and jamming geometry. Another approach is to 
cover all or part of the modulation range with a broadband jamming signal that is 
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received by the LPI radar receiver with adequate power to create adequate JSR in the 
“de-chirped” output.  
Early research investigation of the anti-jamming aspect of linear FM pulse 
compression technique is provided in [3]. A mathematical model of a linear FM pulsed 
radar is constructed on the Signal Processing Workstation (SPW). The model generates a 
simulated chirp pulsed signal, which is added with selective interfering signals and 
evaluates the level of attenuation at the matched filter output. The experiment suggests 
that linear FM radar can recover useful echo signals under moderate white noise 
conditions. It also shows that the chirp radar, due to its high dependency on the frequency 
parameter for the matched filter implementation, is completely useless in differentiating a 
genuine chirp signal and a hostile jammer signal when the jammer produces signals that 
have a very similar frequency spectrum to the chirp signal [3]. 
Another document discussing detection and jamming of LPI radars has also 
provided some insight into FMCW jamming. It is suggested in [4] that false range targets 
may be displayed on an FMCW radar by slightly shifting the frequency of the return. The 
authors also suggest that velocity-gate pull-off (VGPO) can affect the signal processing 
in the radar. As far as noise jamming, narrow-band Doppler noise may also be quite 
effective since the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in the LPI receiver is already at quite a low 
value [4]. 
A brief discussion on FMCW jamming is seen in [5]. The author comments that 
FMCW can be easily overwhelmed by high-power pulse jammer. For that reason, FMCW 
radars are not generally used in military surveillance and weapons control systems. 
With many existing discussions on FMCW jamming, this thesis project proposes 
a different research approach by looking into FMCW radar signal processing architecture 
in detail and seeks a possible EA solution. Experiments supporting the theoretical result 
are designed using both computer simulation and physical hardware. The MATLAB 
FMCW radar model is constructed to simulate the radar digital signal processing (DSP) 
response to different jamming waveforms. Hardware testing using LVRTS is also 
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conducted as an auxiliary measure of investigation. The thesis provides an in-depth 
investigation on FMCW jamming and can be used to verify the existing theories. 
C. PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
The research project provides an in-depth investigation on FMCW radar using all 
available approaches including theory, hardware experiment and computer simulation. 
The thesis discusses in detail FMCW radar DSP and its inherent capability of resisting 
interference. From the discussion of and references to other related work, an insight into 
effective jamming technique can be revealed.  
The hardware experiment using LVRTS has shown the limits of the training tool 
for this project. Since LVRTS is marketed as an education system that is compacted with 
various radar capabilities, the circuitry does not provide the full functionality of each type 
of radar as it would have in a full-scaled radar system. For FMCW mode, the LVRTS 
only allows range measurement with no target Doppler preserved. Therefore, with the 
available equipment, only limited results can be drawn from the experiment, which is far 
from sufficient for conclusive results. 
The MATLAB simulation model is constructed to compensate for the incapability 
of the hardware experiment. The radar model is constructed based on a homodyne 
FMCW radar signal processing procedure. The radar model can correctly evaluate the 
target range and velocity from the delay and Doppler shift of the received signal 
waveform. It is also capable of emulating the FMCW radar DSP response when the 
computer-generated jamming signals are applied. Also, the model is built in such way 
that most parameters have the freedom for adjustment for testing different scenarios. 
From the results of all three approaches, the research concludes that from the DSP 
stand point, repeater jamming provides the most penetration to FMCW DSP, while 
requiring the least jamming power. Given the radar passband, pulse jamming can also be 
effective if sufficient pulse repetition frequency (PRF) is available. For noise jamming to 
be effective, the signal frequencies must be limited within the radar passband, as 
wideband noise jamming wastes much energy outside the radar band. From the EW 
standpoint, the effectiveness of jamming techniques highly depends on the information 
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available on the victim radar. For example, as studies suggest that repeater jamming is 
most effective against FMCW radar, in the real-world case when the emitter parameters 
are not available in the EA system library, repeater jamming may not work at all. In the 
worst case, in a noisy environment where the radar transmission band cannot be 
identified, barrage jamming may become the only EA option. In short, in the world of 
EW, there is no perfect jamming technique that can work in every scenario.  
The thesis has provided a broad discussion and experiment results that may 
benefit many researchers in related fields. As the MATLAB simulation in this research is 
under a simple two-dimensional self-screen jamming scenario with no clutter involved, 
future modification of the program can be done for the study of angular deception by 
adding three-dimensional scan pattern to the model. With further development, complex 
FMCW jamming scenarios such as multi-target and battle-field meteorology can be 
simulated and studied.  
D. THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter II provides an overview of the FMCW radar system including hardware 
architecture and signal processing principles. A homodyne FMCW radar system is used 
as an example of a typical FMCW architecture. The hardware components and their 
functionalities are explained individually in the order of the signal processing procedure. 
The principles discussed in this chapter are the prerequisites to the development of the 
MATLAB model to be used for jamming simulation.  
In Chapter III, an attempt to test the jamming effect using a laboratory radar 
system is discussed. LVRTS is capable of target detection using a triangular-modulated 
FMCW waveform. The experiment deploys arbitrary waveform generators, which 
transmit jamming signals to the LVRTS receiver to emulate an EW jamming scenario. 
However, due to the internal circuitry design of LVRTS and limitations in jamming 
power, no decisive conclusion can be drawn.  
Chapter IV presents a MATLAB model that emulates the functionality of the 
homodyne FMCW radar discussed in Chapter II. The model design and simulation 
algorithm are explained. An anti-ship capable missile (ASCM) scenario providing 
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simulation parameters is used to perform a signal-only simulation, in which the target 
echo is processed at the radar receiver model for target information (range and velocity).  
Chapter V discusses the EA techniques against FMCW. The chapter begins with 
an investigation of the FMCW radar’s inherent resistance to interference, which leads to a 
discussion on probable EA techniques in the succeeding section. The proposed jamming 
techniques, or waveforms, are modeled and tested for effectiveness using the FMCW 
MATLAB model.  
Chapter VI elevates the discussion of FMCW jamming from simulation to the 
real-world EW application level. Given the proposed jamming techniques from Chapter 
V, the real-world implementation requirements, challenges and solutions are investigated. 
Also, the trends of future EA and EP measures are briefly discussed, before the research 




II. FREQUENCY MODULATED CONTINUOUS WAVE RADAR 
The high duty cycle feature of the continuous wave (CW) waveform spreads the 
transmitter power over time and reduces probability of interception. The most popular 
linear modulation waveform utilized is the triangular FMCW emitter, since it can 
measure the target’s range and range rate [1].  
This chapter explains the principle architecture and signal-processing algorithm of 
a homodyne FMCW radar to provide a general understanding of FMCW signal 
processing. Section A gives an overview of the signal processing procedure of a FMCW 
radar system, as well as a brief explanation of component functionalities. In Section B, 
mathematical expressions of triangular waveform are derived, as they are critical to the 
MATLAB simulation design to be discussed in the succeeding chapter. Sections C and D 
discuss the FMCW search mode and track mode signal processing. Finally, a laboratory 
FMCW radar system is presented as an example.  
A. SINGLE ANTENNA FMCW RADAR ARCHITECTURE 
The block diagram in Figure 1 illustrates the typical architecture of a single 
antenna FMCW radar. To transmit radar signals and receive target echo simultaneously 
through a single antenna, a circulator is used to provide individual channels for both 
signals. A reflective power canceller (RPC) nullifies the transmitter leakage at the 
receiver to achieve high insolation, which avoids degrading sensitivity [6]. The mixer 
takes a portion of the transmitting signal and uses it as the reference signal that correlates 
the received echo signal. The resultant output is what is called a beat signal whose 
frequency is proportional to the propagation time of the radar signal. This mixing process 
also down-converts the radio frequency (RF) signal to an intermediate frequency (IF) 
signal. IF signal is preferred in signal processing because components that operate at high 
frequency are less stable and more expensive.  
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Figure 1.  Block Diagram of a homodyne triangular FMCW radar (after [1]).  
A low-pass filter is located at the mixer output to filter out unwanted signal noise.  
The filter cutoff frequency is set at the maximum beat frequency corresponding to the 
maximum detectable range for which the radar is designed. As the beat frequency is 
much lower than the echo signal frequency, only a fraction of received noise can reach 
the low noise amplifier (LNA). This limits the amount of noise being amplified, which 
can cause unwanted clutter in the signal spectrum and affect detection efficiency [1].   
A complex analog-to-digital converter (ADC/CADC) digitizes the complex 
analog signal. The complex ADC outputs (I/Q channel) are then evaluated in the 
frequency domain using an FFT computation. An envelope approximation detector 
measures the magnitude of both in-phase and quadrature signals and computes the overall 
signal spectral magnitude approximated by 
 x = amax | I |,|Q |{ }+ bmin | I |,|Q |{ }  (2.1) 
where a  and b  are the simple multiplying coefficients [7]. An envelope approximation 
detector is useful because a radar computer can perform the calculations easier and faster 
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than the I 2 +Q2  approach. However, different choices of a  and b  result in a different 
error. An in-depth investigation of an envelope approximation detector can be found in 
[7]. 
The Greatest of Constant False Alarm Rate detector (GO-CFAR) searches for 
target signals in the magnitude spectrum. Figure 2 illustrates an n-cell GO-CFAR 
structure. The detector can be thought of as a sliding window, moving from low to high 
along the frequency spectrum axis, with a test cell in the middle and  numbers of 
reference cells on the each side. The signal magnitude under the test cell is measured and 
compared with the threshold voltage . When the test cell voltage is above the 
threshold limit, the detector considers there is a target within that bin. On the other hand, 
if the test cell voltage is less than the threshold voltage, no target is detected at that test 
cell.  
 




The threshold voltage depends on the average signal voltage within the reference 
cells on each side of the test cell. The summations of signal voltages at the reference cells 
on each side, y1  and y2 , are compared in magnitude. The voltage with greater value is 
then divided by n for the average signal magnitude in each reference cell, before 
multiplying by a threshold multiplier Tm , and then becomes the threshold voltage VT . 
The value of the threshold multiplier depends on the minimum allowable probability of 
false alarm (PFA) of the GO-CFAR detector.  
Due to the possible power leakage in magnitude spectrum, often a few extra cells 
(known as guard cells) are added on each side of the test cell as isolation [8]. This 
technique is used in the MATLAB model, which will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
The output of GO-CFAR is the filter where targets are detected. Targets are 
declared for both up-chirp and down-chirp (beat frequency f1b and f2b respectively.) of 
the triangular modulation. The actual target position and velocity can be calculated with 
the sum and difference between f1b and f2b . Section B discusses mathematical 
expression of FMCW triangular modulation, as well as target range and velocity 
calculation in detail.  
B. FMCW TRIANGULAR WAVEFORM DESIGN 
This section explains the FMCW triangular waveform architecture and how 
parameters are determined. The principles also apply to the parameter design used in the 
simulation, which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
1. Transmitted Signal 
Since a FMCW waveform is deterministic, it can be described entirely in a 
mathematical manner. The frequency of the first section (up-chirp) of the transmitted 
waveform is expressed as [1]: 





t   (2.2) 
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where fc  is the signal carrier frequency, !F  is the modulation bandwidth, and tm  is the 
modulation period. Figure 3 illustrates the triangular waveform modulation and resultant 
beat frequency.  
 
Figure 3.  Linear frequency modulated triangular waveform and the Doppler shifted 
received signal (after [1]). 
The phase of the transmitter RF signal is [1] 
 !1(t) = 2" f1(x)dx0
t
#  (2.3) 
From (2.2) and (2.3) 
















1  (2.4) 
The complex form of the transmitted signal waveform is  
 St1(t) = e j!1(t )   (2.5) 
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Therefore, 























  (2.6) 
For the second section (down-chirp) triangular waveform: 





t  (2.7) 
The same derivation applies to the second section. The equation is therefore   























  (2.8) 
2. Received Signal 
The received signal can be expressed as the transmitted waveform with a round-
trip time delay td . In the case of a moving target, the Doppler frequency shift must also 




  (2.9) 
Therefore, the received signal frequency becomes 





(t ! td )+
2V
#c
  (2.10) 





(t " td )+
2V
#c
  (2.11) 
where td  is the propagation delay of the received waveform, V  is the relative target 
velocity and !c  is the wavelength of the carrier frequency.  
Note that !c  is an approximation of the instantaneous wavelength at time t , as 
the actual wavelength varies with time. The approximation is appropriate as the 
modulation bandwidth is small relative to the carrier frequency. 
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Same as (2.6), the returned signal from the point target can be presented as 
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Similarly, for the second section 
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C. SEARCH MODE SIGNAL PROCESSING 
The capability of target detection is closely related to the parameter design of the 
modulation waveform. The key parameters of FMCW modulation are the modulation 
bandwidth and modulation period. Modulation bandwidth is determined depending on the 
desired range resolution of the radar.  
 
!F = c2!R   (2.16) 
where !R  is the desired range resolution; !F  is the modulation bandwidth; c ! 3"108  
m/s is the speed of light. 
An imaging radar system requires wide modulation bandwidth in order to obtain 
high range resolution, which allows the resultant Range-Doppler image to present the 
structure features of the target. On the other hand, for search radar, range resolution needs 
to be greater than the target length in order to avoid the returned signal being spread 
across multiple range bins in the spectrum and to avoid an increase in the PFA.  
The modulation period of the transmitted waveform is critical for moving target 
acquisition. From the radar perspective, maintaining a moving target in the same range 
bin throughout a modulation period is desired [1]. Otherwise the target smears in the 
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spectrum and causes detection difficulties. To detect a target of maximum velocity Vmax , 





Another condition is that tm  should be several times the maximum round-trip 
delay td . This condition minimizes the loss in effective transmit bandwidth and power 
and also provides a high velocity resolution [1].  
Due to the time differences between the transmitted and received waveform, only 
part of the modulation period is utilized in search mode signal processing. Recall from 
Figure 3 that for each up-chirp or down-chirp section, only within the time interval where 
both transmitted and received waveform have identical chirp rate can the beat frequency 
be evaluated correctly at the FFT stage. Therefore, the time interval of interest within one 
modulation period is the difference between tm  and td . However, since a target echo 
delay varies depending on the target position, the coherent processing interval of a radar 
system is determined based on the maximum detectable range for which the system is 
designed. The coherent processing interval of a radar system with tm  modulation period 
is calculated as 
 to = tm ! tdmax  (2.18) 
where tdmax  is the maximum echo delay expected by the radar. This allows the echo 
signal to be processed correctly for any in-bound target while keeping the coherent 




Figure 4.  Coherent processing interval at maximum detectable range (above) and in-ranges 
(below). 
The effective bandwidth within the coherent processing interval is then  
 !F ' = !F( totm
) Hz  (2.19) 
The beat frequency for the 1st and 2nd section is then 













with both beat frequencies calculated, the target range can be computed as 
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 R = cto4!F ' ( f '1b+ f '2b ) m  (2.22) 





= !4 ( f '2b" f '1b ) m/s  (2.23) 
Note that Equations (2.20) and (2.21) are provided only for the completeness of 
the theory. In the MATLAB simulation to be discussed, the beat frequencies are 
evaluated by correlating the transmitted and received signals, as they would be in an 
actual FMCW system. 
D. TRACK MODE SIGNAL PROCESSING 
Once a target is detected in the search mode, the FMCW tracking mode is needed 
to lock-on and monitor the target. There are two different approaches to track the target 
position. 
The first approach is to keep the target beat frequency constant by varying the 
transmitter bandwidth [1]. Recall that in the search mode signal processing, the detected 
target range is computed from the measured beat frequency f1b  and f2b  (2.22). A target 
detected at f1b  and f2b  will show up in filter fb  in the track mode signal processing.  
 fb =
fb1 + fb2
2  (2.24) 
Using this relationship, (2.19) can therefore be arranged as 
 !F ' = cfbto2R  (2.25) 
This tracking approach requires the detected target beat frequency to remain in filter fb . 
With cfbto  being a constant, the effective bandwidth needed becomes larger as the range 
to target gets smaller. This algorithm requires constant adjustments of the transmitting 
signal bandwidth based on the target range calculated in each sweep. The major 
advantage of this approach is that since the target beat frequency is a constant value, a 
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narrow-band pass filter centering this frequency can be designed to filter out noise and 
increase SNR.  
The second approach is to maintain the transmitting bandwidth and allow the beat 
frequency to vary. The target’s position can be followed in signal processing by 
monitoring the position of the FFT peak detector output. The advantage of this method is 
that the receiver LPF used in the search mode can also be used for the track  
processing [1].  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter provides the essential theory of FMCW signal processing techniques. 
Both homodyne FMCW radar signal processing algorithm and triangular modulation 
waveform design are discussed. However, for the scope of this project, post-detection 
signal processing is left out for future investigation. 
The next chapter provides a discussion on the attempt to investigate FMCW 
jamming using a laboratory radar system. An experiment is designed to conduct EA by 
having an arbitrary waveform generator and Radar Jamming Pod Trainer generate 
interfering signal into the radar receiver and observe for effectiveness. However, due to 
the limited capability of the hardware, only limited results can be obtained. The chapter 
starts with an introduction to LVRTS, followed by a discussion of experiment design and 
problems encountered. The experiment is therefore adjusted to adapt to the hardware 
limitations. The result of the compromised test is also discussed. 
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III. FMCW JAMMING WITH LAB-VOLT RADAR TRAINING 
SYSTEM 
LVRTS is a laboratory radar system that is compatible with several radar 
configurations, including FMCW. The compact and low-power characteristics of LVRTS 
allow it to be operated safely and make it prime for a laboratory environment. An 
investigation on FMCW jamming by applying jamming waveforms to the LVRTS was 
attempted. However, due to the constraint of the hardware, no significant result was 
found in this experiment.  
This chapter briefly introduces the Lab-Volt system, jamming test method and 
results. Also, the constraints of the system are discussed.  
A. INTRODUCTION TO LAB-VOLT RADAR TRAINING SYSTEM 
LVRTS is a laboratory radar system designed to demonstrate the principles and 
scenarios of electronic warfare for training purposes. It is highly configurable for 
different radar searching and tracking techniques, target parameters and several EA 
techniques. The radar system can be configured as pulse Doppler, CW or FMCW radars 
depending on the training objectives. The Moving Target Indication (MTI) processor and 
Moving Target Detection (MTD) processor are also included in this equipment. The 
Target Positioning System can provide a moving target of interchangeable size and shape 
for target-acquiring experiments. The radar jamming pod trainer is capable of performing 
direct or modulated noise jamming as well as repeater jamming. Other sub-systems 
featuring synthetic-aperture radar (SAR), inverse synthetic-aperture radar (ISAR), RCS 
measurement and phase array technology are also available.  
Despite the wide-range functionality provided by LVRTS, the system does not 
represent a full-scale radar system with any of its configurations, as it is specifically 
designed for the experimental courses and procedures provided by the manufacturer. 
Although CW and FMCW modes are available for the LVRTS transmitter, most signal 
processing and EW scenario provided by the system are built under pulse Doppler radar 
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mode. In the manufacturer course design, CW and FMCW mode are simply used to 
demonstrate the principle of these types of radars.  
The FMCW mode of LVRTS has limited capabilities. It is limited to triangular 
waveform modulation at a fixed carrier frequency of 9.4 GHz, with a slightly adjustable 
modulation period and bandwidth. A block-diagram of LVRTS FMCW configuration is 
shown in Figure 5. The FMCW output of the system is the beat signal, which can be 
observed on an oscilloscope. When the FMCW output is connected to a frequency 
counter, the beat frequency can be measured and the target range can be calculated by 
hand. As this research is interested in investigating how different jamming techniques can 
affect FMCW in detecting target range and velocity, a project to build a MATLAB 
program capable of processing the FMCW output that can evaluate both target range and 
velocity is proposed. With the ability to correctly process the FMCW output signal, the 
system can be tested for its response to EA attack by applying different jamming 
waveforms using an arbitrary waveform generator.  
 
Figure 5.  Block diagram of FMCW radar configuration (after [9]). 
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B. ATTEMPTED LVRTS EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
 
Figure 6.  Attempted FMCW jamming test using LVRTS. 
The FMCW jamming test design is shown in Figure 6. The design of the 
experiment is first to put a metal plate target in motion along the radar line of sight using 
Target Positioning table, as shown in Figure 7. The LVRTS transmits triangular-
modulated FMCW waveform to illuminate the target and receiver target echo at the 
receiving antenna. The FMCW output signal is then digitized to an ADC and quantized at 
the LABVIEW program. The output of LABVIEW is an Excel array containing the 
magnitude samples of the signal. This array is then put into MATLAB to evaluate the 
beat frequency and calculate for target range and range rate. For EA testing, one or more 
arbitrary waveform generators can be implemented to perform several jamming 
techniques that interfere with the received signal. The jamming effect can be evaluated by 
observing the change in target range and velocity computed in MATLAB.  
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Figure 7.  LVRTS antennas and plate target (after [9]). 
 
Figure 8.  LVRTS receiver module block diagram (after [10]). 
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The experiment was, however, unsuccessful as the LVRTS signal processing does 
not preserve the Doppler information of the returned signal. As shown in the receiver 
block-diagram depicted in Figure 8, the received signal is filtered by a 1 kHz high-pass 
filter (HPF) prior to the FMCW output. This HPF is designed for the purpose of reducing 
possible clutter resulted from close object in a laboratory environment (i.e., the front edge 
of the target table) and ensures accurate range measurement. However, this filtering also 
erases the Doppler frequency embedded in the signal, as Doppler measurement is not 
intended in LVRTS design.  
C. JAMMING TEST USING ARBITRARY WAVEFORM GENERATOR 
Given that the LVRTS is only capable of range measurement, a compromised test 
is run by simply observing the change in beat frequency, while applying jamming signals 
to the radar receiver. This extended test deploys signal generators and matched horn 
antennas as adversary jammers, which are attempting to corrupt the signal going into the 
LVRTS receiver, hence corrupting the interpreted beat frequency.  
The LVRTS is set to FMCW mode where fc = 9.4 GHz, fm =  1 kHz and !F =  1 
GHz. The radar illuminates a plate target 1.55m away, located at the center of the target 
table, and receives the reflected waveform. Under no jamming circumstances is the beat 
frequency shown on the frequency counter on the order of 40 kHz. The experiment set up 
is as shown in Figure 7. Note that the jammer horn antennas are located at approximately 
15 degrees from the peak of receiving antenna main beam. Jamming techniques are tested 
for the target range 1.1m, 1.55m and 2m away from the radar pedestal. 
First, a tone jamming signal set at radar center frequency 9.4 GHz is injected into 
the radar. To avoid excessive jamming power damaging the LVRTS receiver circuits, the 
power level is limited to 0 dBm. When the plate target is 1.1 meter from the radar 
antenna, almost no jamming effect is observed. At 1.55m, the jamming effect is also 
minimal. When target is positioned at 2m away from the radar antenna, the extended 
range increases the JSR, thus a slight increment of beat frequency can be observed from 
the frequency counter. The tone jamming result is summarized in Table 1. Note that since 
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the beat frequency measured by the frequency counter fluctuates, the test for each range 
is run five times. The result is an averaged value from all five trials. 
Table 1.   LVRTS tone jamming result. 
Target Range 
(m) 
Avg. Beat Frequency 
(Hz) 
Avg. Beat Frequency 
with jamming (Hz) Avg. Error (Hz) 
1.10 34,816 34,817 2.6 
1.55 39,942 39,955 6.6 
2.00 47,288 47,438 147.8 
 
A triangular FMCW signal is also tested using the same procedure. For the best 
jamming result, the jamming signal is modulated according to the radar modulation 
parameter, with center frequency of 9.4 GHz and 1 ms modulation period. However, due 
to equipment capability, only 10 MHz modulation bandwidth is available, whereas 1 GHz 
is desired. The test result is shown in Table 2. Although the modulation parameter is not 
ideal, the triangular FMCW jamming has a more significant effect on the radar than does 
tone jamming.  
Table 2.    LVRTS Triangular FMCW jamming result. 
Target Range 
(m) 
Avg. Beat Frequency 
(Hz) 
Avg. Beat Frequency 
with jamming (Hz) Avg. Error (Hz) 
1.10 34,816 34,867 51 
1.55 39,942 40,049 113.6 
2.00 47,288 47,514 206.6 
 
To compare the differences between modulation waveforms, a sinusoidal FMCW 
signal is also tested. The modulation parameter is identical to the previous test except the 
modulation waveform. From Table 3, it can be seen that sinusoidal FMCW jamming also 




Table 3.   LVRTS Sinusoidal FMCW jamming result. 
Target Range 
(m) 
Avg. Beat Frequency 
(Hz) 
Avg. Beat Frequency 
with jamming (Hz) Avg. Error (Hz) 
1.10 34,816 34,869 52.6 
1.55 39,942 40,031 84.2 
2.00 47,288 47,483 184.8 
 
During the pulse jamming test, the radar is injected with a pulse jamming signals 
with pulsewidth of 10 µs, carrier frequencies of 9.4 GHz and PRF of 10 kHz. As the 
signal generator power is limited to 0 dBm, no jamming effect is observed at all ranges.  
The Lab-Volt Radar Jamming Pod Trainer provides the capability of generating a 
band-limited random noise jamming signal that can be used for the experiment. The noise 
is centered at 9 GHz with 1 GHz bandwidth. The band-limited random noise has relative 
strong effect to the radar beat frequency when the target is placed 2m from the radar, as 
shown in Table 4.  
Table 4.   LVRTS random noise jamming result. 
Target Range 
(m) 
Avg. Beat Frequency 
(Hz) 
Avg. Beat Frequency 
with jamming (Hz) Avg. Error (Hz) 
1.10 34,816 34,896 78 
1.55 39,942 40,019 80.2 
2.00 47,288 47,512 255.2 
 
The effectiveness of test jamming waveforms is compared in Table 5. Band-
limited random noise has induced the most beat frequency error at radar-to-target range 
of 1.1m and 2m, whereas the triangular FMCW has strongest effect on the 1.55-meter 
trial. Sinusoidal FMCW is slightly less effective than triangular FMCW, with tone 
jamming being the least effective jamming waveform. 
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1.10 2.6 51 52.6 78 
1.55 6.6 113.6 84.2 80.2 
2.00 147.8 206.6 184.8 255.2 
 
However, the result from this experiment can only provide limited information 
and is insufficient for drawing a conclusive result. From Table 5, it can be seen that the 
results have obvious inconsistency, as the random noise jamming being the most 
effective at 1.10-meter trial and 2-meter trial but next to the least effective at 1.55-meter 
trial. Also the errors induced by each jamming waveform are too little to make a fair 
comparison. For random noise, which has induced the most beat frequency error (255.2 
Hz), the corresponding range error is less than 2 cm. Therefore, the small amount of 
difference between jamming results does not confirm that one jamming technique is more 
effective than the others. The test results are plotted in Figure 9. Notice that the results 
from different jamming waveforms are almost indistinguishable for each range. 
 
Figure 9.  LVRTS jamming test result. 
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Hardware constraints are also a major factor that influences the test result. To 
prevent high jamming power from damaging the radar receiver circuitry, the jamming 
power is limited to 0 dBm. The power constraint has limited the variance of the jamming 
result, making it difficult to compare jamming effectiveness between different 
waveforms. Furthermore, the power constraint has paralyzed the pulse jamming signal, 
which requires high peak power to be effective, especially against FMCW radar. Another 
hardware problem is that the signal generator is not capable of generating a FMCW 
jamming waveform having the same chirp rate as the radar signal waveform. 
Theoretically, a jamming waveform that has the same modulation parameter as the victim 
radar can be very effective in FMCW jamming [1]. 
D. SUMMARY 
Due to the circuitry design of the receiver, the attempt to investigate the 
effectiveness of EA interfering with target range and range rate using LVRTS was 
unsuccessful. By simply observing the beat frequency variance under the jamming 
condition, few conclusions can be drawn. Testing with high jamming power may provide 
more constructive results, but the potential for damaging the LVRTS circuit always 
exists. It can be concluded that LVRTS does not provide the precision and stability 
required for an in-depth jamming experiment. 
With the hardware test failing to provide decisive results, the research has turned 
to a computer-simulation project using MATLAB, which provides enhanced accuracy 
and choices of jamming techniques. The next chapter introduces the design of a radar 
model that is capable of emulating a FMCW radar DSP behavior. A simulation result 
based on an ASCM scenario is also presented. 
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IV. SIMULATION DESIGN 
This chapter introduces the design of the MATLAB model used for the FMCW 
jamming simulation. The simulation scenario is based on an ASCM scene with the 
missile as the FMCW emitter and the ship as the jammer. The radar model is constructed 
based on the principle and architecture of FMCW radar signal processing discussed in 
Chapter II. This chapter also provides the simulation results without the jamming signal 
applied. The jamming simulation is discussed separately in Chapter V.  
A. ASCM SCENARIO 
 
Figure 10.  ASCM LPI emitter-ship scenario. 
In the simulation scenario, an antiship missile is launched to attack a low radar 
cross-section（RCS) warship as shown in Figure 10. The missile, traveling at Vt = 300  
m/s, utilizes an FMCW seeker with triangular modulation. The range to the target is 21 
km when the emitter starts transmitting. The warship has a RCS of 500 m2  and is moving 
at a speed of Vr = 0  m/s. That is, the ship can be assumed to be stationary with respect to 
the missile, thus the missile-to-target closing velocity V is 300 m/s. With early 
intelligence, the warship is able to locate the incoming missile on the radar screen in the 
early stages. An onboard jammer is used to perform EA against the missile’s seeker. The 
missile emitter parameter design is listed in Table 6. 
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Table 6.   MATLAB Emitter Parameter Design. 
Carrier frequency fc   4 GHz 
Modulation period tm   1.0 ms 
Coherent processing interval to   800 µ s 
Modulation bandwidth !F   15 MHz 
Effective modulation bandwidth !F '   12 MHz 
Range resolution !R   10.0 m 
Effective range resolution !R'   12.3 m 
FFT size NFFT   8,192 
Average transmitter power  Pt   Adaptive 
ADC sampling speed  fs   6.02 MHz 
Detection signal-to-noise ratio SNRRo   20 dB 
Receiver Noise factor FR   10 
Filter width !f   735 Hz 
System losses L   10 
Antenna gain G   810 
Number of modulation periods N 10 
 
B. FMCW RADAR MODEL 
The Radar Model is built following the same DSP procedure discussed in Chapter 
II. Individual radar components are emulated in separate coding sections. Figure 11 is the 
first level MATLAB model block diagram. Note that circulator and low noise amplifier 
are omitted as they are not necessary in the computer simulation. The following sections 
discuss the design and algorithm of each component individually. 
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Figure 11.  First level MATLAB FMCW radar jamming model block diagram. 
1. Transmitter Model 
 
Figure 12.  Transmitter MATLAB model block diagram. 
In the transmitter model shown in Figure 12, the input target range and velocity 
are first evaluated with (2.17) to determine whether the target could be correctly detected 
with the current system parameter design. Since the model involves array operations, 
which require the array index to be integers, this stage also evaluates if all input variables 
can be correctly processed at a later stage. If the parameter-check fails, the simulation is 
interrupted; otherwise it proceeds to compute transmitting signal. 
 32 
To determine the amplitude of the transmitted waveform, At , the required 
transmitter average power must be calculated in the first place. Due to the 
implementation of the power managing system, the value of transmitted power is 
adaptive to keep a constant SNR as the target range decreases.  











where FR  is the receiver noise factor. kTo = 4.0 !10"21  W/Hz, L  is the system losses, 
SNRRo  is the required output signal-to-noise ratio for target detection, !f = 1 tm  is the 
filter width, R  is the range from radar to target, and !  is the target RCS. For this 
simulation, the resultant peak power for detecting the warship at 21 km is 10.5W (10 
dBW), as shown in Figure 13. This value is less than what an actual missile would have 
as the radar model operates at 4 GHz carrier frequency, whereas a real system operates at 
around 9 GHz. The simulation chooses a lower frequency due to the constraints of the 
computing power of the hardware.  
 
Figure 13.  Radar transmitted power with respect to range-to-target. 
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The peak amplitude of the transmitted waveform can be approximated as 
 At = Pt  (4.2) 
The transmitted signal amplitude At is computed as 3.2 Volts.  
In order to digitally generate the transmitting signal, the digital sampling rate 
must be at least twice as much as the maximum signal frequency according to the 
Nyquist theorem. In the case of triangular modulation, the maximum frequency is the 
sum of the carrier frequency, half of the modulation frequency and the maximum Doppler 
shift. The signal generation rate fSigGEN  is thus 





)  (4.3) 
From the given parameter setting in Table 6, the maximum frequency of the 
signal is approximately 4.01 GHz. According to (4.3), fSigGEN  is chosen to be 8.02 GHz.  
The transmitter model generates an array of complex values using the triangular 
modulation equations, (2.2) and (2.6) through (2.8), which are rewritten in discrete 
format as  
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where n  is the time index operator and tSG  is the signal sampling period. 
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Using the parameters in Table 6, the output of the transmitting signal model is a 
complex array St . This output will be used in the echo power calculation and correlation 
process to come. For five triangular CW waveforms, the generated FMCW triangular 
waveform is depicted in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.  Simulated triangular modulation waveform with N=10 modulation periods. 
2. Receiver Model 
 
Figure 15.  Received signal MATLAB model block diagram. 
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The receiver model block diagram is as shown in Figure 15. The receiver model is 
similar to the transmitted model, except the time delay and Doppler frequency are added. 
The Doppler frequency shift was introduced in (2.9). The propagation delay is the time 
required for the transmitted signal to propagate to the target and return, therefore  
 td =
2R
c  (4.8) 
To evaluate the echo amplitude at the receiver end, two-way signal spreading loss 
and target reflection gain must be considered. Two-way spreading loss is expressed as 
 Lprop2 = !64 ! 40 log(F)! 40 log(d)  (4.9) 
where F  is the signal carrier frequency (in MHz,) and d  is the propagation distance (in 
km.) The signal reflected from target has additional loss (gain) of 
 L! = "39 + 20 log(F)+10 log(RCS)  (4.10) 
The signal power at the radar receiver is the sum of transmitter power, antenna gain and 
above losses 
Pr (dB) = Pt (dB)+ 2G !103! 20 log(F)! 40 log(d)+10 log(RCS)  (4.11) 
the calculated received power is ! 132 dBW, or 0.06 pW. Figure 16 shows the received 
power as a function of range being constant due to the transmitted signal power being 
adapted to keep the SNR at a specified level within the receiver (see Figure 13). The 
amplitude of the signal is approximated by (4.2), which gives 0.23 µ V. 
 36 
 
Figure 16.  Received signal power with respect to range-to-target. 
The received signal frequencies for up-chirp and down-chirp sections are 


















and the received waveform can then be calculated as 
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From above equations, the calculated transmitted and received signals can be 
plotted as shown in Figure 17. Note that the slopes on the modulation are parallel.  
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Figure 17.  MATLAB simulated FMCW triangular waveform. 
3. Mixer 
The mixer model takes the received signal and jamming signal to correlate with 
the reference signal. The output of this model is the summation of both correlated signals 
(Figure 18). White Gaussian noise is added to the signal prior to the correlation process. 
The required SNR at the receiver is a constant 20 dB. 
 
Figure 18.  Mixer MATLAB model block diagram. 
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At the mixer, the reference signal and received signal are multiplied in the time 
domain. Since the transmitted signal is complex, the reference signal is the complex 
conjugate of the transmitted signal. The correlated signal, or beat signal, is therefore 
 Sbeat (t) = St*(t)St (t ! td )  (4.16) 
The asterisk above the transmitted implies complex conjugate. Same procedure applies to 
the jamming signal array, which will be discussed later in the chapter. 
4. Low-Pass Filter  
Due to the trigonometric identity regarding the sum of cosines, the product of two 
signals has two distinct sinusoidal components, whose frequencies are the sum and 
differences of the two signal frequencies being correlated [11]. The low-pass filter 
eliminates the higher beat frequencies as well as any noise above the filter cutoff 
frequency. The filter cutoff frequency is designed to match the maximum beat frequency 
corresponding to the maximum operational range of the radar. The maximum beat 






  (4.17) 
where Rmax  and Vmax  is the maximum detectable range and range rate according to the 
radar design. Note that value of fbmax  mostly depends on that of Rmax , since the Doppler 
frequency shift is relatively small. The filter cutoff frequency is therefore 
 fcutoff = fb_max  (4.18) 
The low-pass filter model (Figure 19) is a finite impulse response (FIR) filter and 
is built using the MATLAB fdesign.lowpass function in Signal Processing toolbox. The 
maximum detectable range of the radar model is designed to be 30 km, which gives a 
maximum beat frequency on the order of 3 MHz. The cutoff frequency of the filter is 
therefore set to be 3 MHz. The filter magnitude response is shown in Figure 20. 
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Figure 19.  Low-pass filter MATLAB model block diagram. 
 
Figure 20.  Low-pass filter magnitude response. 
5. Digital Signal Processing  
a. ADC 
In the MATLAB simulation, signals are being generated and processed 
digitally. The maximum signal frequency being processed at this stage is significantly 
less than the original signal, down sampling is beneficial for simulation efficiency. The 
sampling frequency is chosen to be twice as much as the maximum beat frequency. 
 40 
Therefore, fs  is 6.02 MHz. The ADC down conversion is achieved by sampling the beat 
signal array every fSigGEN / fs  samples.  
b. Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) 
In this stage, the beat signal array is broken down and investigated 
individually every modulation period. Prior to the transformation, the signal array is first 
scaled by the Blacksman-Harris window to reduce possible Discrete Fourier Transform 
(DFT) leakage, which may cause strong sidelobes in the spectrum. Fourier analysis 
converts each individual period of signal from time domain to frequency domain, but the 
imaginary part of the complex signal is omitted. In order to allow the signal magnitude to 
be detected correctly in the magnitude detector, the complex signal of each modulation 
period must be transformed separately (Figure 21).  
The FFT size of each section is determined by the number of samples 
within one coherent processing interval. 
 L = fsto   (4.19) 
The signal is then padded up with zeros up to the next power of 2. This can be easily 
done using nextpow2 function. 
 
Figure 21.  ADC and FFT model block diagram. 
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c. Envelope Approximate Detector and GO-CFAR 
The FFT output of both In-phase and Quadrature channels are evaluated 
for combined signal envelope using the envelope approximate detector before going into 
the GO-CFAR model for target detection (Figure 22). 
 
Figure 22.  Envelope approx. detector and GO-CFAR model block diagram. 
Using (2.1), the magnitude approximation detector has the value 1 for both 
constant a  and b . The calculated signal envelopes of N periods (or frequency sweeps) 
are shown in Figure 23. This magnitude of the envelope is to be evaluated for target 
detection at GO-CFAR. With the missile approaching the target, the detected signal 
envelope shifts to the lower frequencies every sweep. As the range-to-target decreases 
with time, the envelope peak gradually shifts toward lower frequencies. 
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Figure 23.  Magnitude detector spectrum (N=10). 
The GO-CFAR model implements one guard cell and eight reference cells 
on each side (Figure 24). The test cell evaluates the value of the magnitude array cell by 
cell for detecting where signal magnitude is above threshold voltage. The choice of 
threshold multiplier is essential. When the chosen value is too low, much noise will be 
detected in the spectrum besides the target signal and causes a false alarm; with too great 
a threshold, the target signal may be hidden in noise. Usually the allowable PFA of a 
radar system is between 1e! 6 and 1e! 7. The scenario requires the PFA to be less than 
1e! 7; a proper value of threshold multiplier needs to be chosen. This leads a separate 
test to investigate on the GO-CFAR response as a function of the number of reference 
cells n  and threshold multiplier Tm  [7].  
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Figure 24.  GO-CFAR processor with one guard cell and eight reference cells on each side. 
With no target present, the noise in the magnitude spectrum can be 
considered as normally distributed samples with zero mean and one variance. This noise 
spectrum is then evaluated by a GO-CFAR detector with n  reference cells and threshold 
multiplier Tm . From the number of detections (signal > threshold) and the total number 
of trials, PFA can be calculated as 
 
 
PFA = # of detection
# of trials
  (4.20) 
A curve-fitting plot can be generated with multiple trials of various choices of n and Tm , 
as shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25.  Envelope Approximation (a  =1, b  =1). 
Depending on the minimum PFA allowed, the threshold multiplier can be 
looked up on the appropriate curve in Figure 25. For this simulation, the GO-CFAR uses 
eight reference cells on each side and requires PFA to be less than 10e! 7. Figure 25 
gives Tm  = 6.  
The GO-CFAR model returns a Target_fb array and detection array. The 
Target_fb array consists of the filter frequency where a target is detected. The detection 
array is used to show in which filters the target is present. A value of one indicates a 
detection and zero otherwise. The detection array is useful for a stem plot to give a clear 
visualization of target position (Figure 26). 
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Figure 26.  Target detection stem plot. 
For the given scenario, a target is first detected (first triangular waveform) 
at bin 2847 for up-chirp periods and bin 2869 for down-chirp periods, which give fb1
=2,091,420 Hz and fb2  = 2,107,587 Hz. The beat frequency gradually reduces as the 
missile approaches over time. The target moves down one range bin at the fifth waveform 
(N=9 and 10), where target is detected at bin 2847 and 2868, giving the new beat 
frequencies =2,091,420 Hz and  = 2,106,853 Hz. This result is used for range and 
range rate calculation.  
d. Range and Range Rate and Error Calculation 
The GO-CFAR model output, Target_fb, is used for range and range rate 
calculation. From (2.22) and (2.23), the calculated range is 20,995.04 meters and range 
rate is 303.13 m/s for the first detection. Compared to the input parameters (R=21,000 m 
and V=300 m/s) the error is computed as 4.96 meters and ! 3.13 m/s. The results are 
satisfying since both errors are within one bin width. The second and third waveforms 
suggest the same result as the first one. The target was undetected on the fourth down-
chirp envelope waveform by the GO-CFAR due to DFT leakage, as the target was 
fb1 fb2
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moving down between the range bins (Sweep 8 in Figure 27). At the fifth waveform, the 
calculated result is 20,991m and 289.35 m/s. The first detection result is summarized in 
Table 7. For comparison, the calculated range and range rate of each triangular waveform 
are listed in Table 8.  
 
Figure 27.  Signal envelope movement (down-chirp sweeps). 
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Table 7.   Key results from simulation. 
Transmter power  Pt   10.45 W 
Transmitting singal amplitude At   3.23 V 
Received Signal Power Pr   6.3e! 14 W 
Received signal amplitude Ar   2.34e! 7 V 
LPF cutoff frequency fcutoff   3,008,000 Hz 
Effective range resolution !R '   12.5 m 
Velocity Resolution !v   46.87 m/s 
Up-Chirp beat frequency fb1   2,091,420.90 Hz 
Down-Chirp beat frequency fb2   2,107,587.89 Hz 
Range to Target Rcal   20,995.04 m 
Range Rate  R
i
cal  303.13 m/s 
Target Velocity  Vt   0 m/s 
Range_Error Rerror  4.96 m 
Target Velocity Error Verror   ! 3.13 m/s 
 
 
Table 8.   Detection result by waveforms for R = 21,000 m, V=300 m/s. 
Waveform fb1  (Hz) fb2  (Hz) Rcal  (m)  R
i
 (m/s) 
1 2,091,420.90  2,105,787.89 20,995.04 303.13 
2 2,091,420.90 2,105,787.89 20,995.04 303.13 
3 2,091,420.90 2,105,787.89 20,995.04 303.13 
4 2,091,420.90 undetected X X 




The FMCW radar model is built to emulate an actual FMCW radar signal process. 
The model is constructed based on an actual radar algorithm and theory discussed in 
Chapter II. The major strength of this model over other existing ones is its flexibility to 
accept various inputs and to allow for future modification. This flexibility is critical as 
signal jamming is a vast subject and many variables are to be tested (i.e., number of 
periods per scan, number of GO-CFAR guard cells, reference cells and more). Not only 
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can it be used for this project but this model also can easily be modified to work with 
other FMCW modulation (sinusoidal, sawtooth) techniques. 
In the simulation performed in this chapter, the model correctly detected and 
evaluated the target range and speed. The next chapter discusses the resistance to 
jamming inherent in FMCW DSP and the possible EA techniques against it. These 
jamming techniques are also modeled in MATLAB to perform jamming simulation to the 
existing radar model. The simulation results can provide an insight into EA against 




V. FMCW SIGNAL JAMMING 
One of the major strengths of FMCW radar is its resistance to jamming signals. 
The FMCW radar DSP mechanism adds processing gain to coherent signals and 
attenuates the non-coherent jamming signals to obtain high SNR at the spectrum. This 
chapter investigates FMCW signal jamming by first discussing the FMCW radar 
jamming resistance from a DSP perspective. From there we discuss the possible jamming 
waveform that can overcome these disadvantages and causes of detection error. The 
jamming waveform model is then created and tested using the MATLAB simulation 
introduced in Chapter IV. The jamming effect is evaluated by calculating the change in 
range and range rate due to jamming. Note that in this chapter the focus is on how radar 
DSP will respond to the selected jamming signals. Real-world feasibility of the proposed 
jamming technique will be discussed in Chapter VI.  
A. FMCW RESISTANCE TO INTERFERENCE 
1. Correlation Process 
FMCW radar implements a homodyne system, which indicates that the receiver 
expects a certain waveform to be processed. When a signal enters the radar receiver, it is 
correlated with a reference signal at the mixer. The correlating process multiplies both 
signals in the time domain and results in a third signal that represents the degree of 
similarity, or coherency, between the two signals [10]. For two identical linear modulated 
chirp signals, separated in time td , the correlated signal is a sinusoid signal with constant 
frequency. The coherency between two mixed signals allows the signal energy to be 
accumulated in the same filter of the spectrum. This gives the signal high SNR at the 
magnitude detection so the frequency, or beat frequency, can be detected by the GO-
CFAR detector.   
Figure 28 is an example that shows the effect of correlation gain when mixing two 
identical chirp signals. Waveform (a) indicates a simple up-chirp signal used as the 
reference signal, and waveform (b) is a delayed replica used as the received signal. The 
resultant correlated signal, shown as waveform (c) in the plot, is a sinusoid signal of 
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constant frequency. The FFT output of the correlated signal is shown in Figure 29. Notice 
that the majority of the signal power is preserved at the 4.6 MHz filter.  
 
Figure 28.  Correlated signal of two identical signal waveforms with time differences. 
 
Figure 29.  FFT output of correlated signal from two coherent signals. 
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On the other hand, when a non-coherent jamming signal is correlated, the signal 
power is scattered into different filters. Figure 30 is the result when correlating the same 
reference signal with a signal of a different chirp rate. Notice that the correlated signal 
(red) has various frequencies. At FFT output (Figure 31), it can be observed that the 
signal energy is distributed across 1.2 MHz bandwidth in the spectrum. Compare the 
signal magnitude in Figures 29 and 31; the coherent signal has a much greater peak 
power than the non-coherent signal after mixing. The high SNR at the spectrum reduces 
the possibility for the non-coherent signal from causing any jamming effect at the GO-
CFAR detector. 
 
Figure 30.  Correlated signal of two different signal waveforms. 
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Figure 31.  FFT output of beat signal from mixing non-coherent jamming signal. 
In the case of random noise due to non-coherency and the spreading nature of 
random noise power distribution, the FFT output of the correlated signal is widely 
distributed across the spectrum. Therefore, it requires great input power to raise the 
overall noise power across the spectrum. As an example, Figures 32 and 33 depict the 
result when correlating the reference single with a normally distributed random noise. 
Noise suppression is the key for FMCW radar to operate in a noisy environment using 
limited power.  
The above examples illustrated the edge that the coherent radar signal has over 
non-coherent jamming signals. For a non-coherent jamming to be successful, the jammer 
must have sufficient power so the jamming signal will still have enough power to cause 
detection error after correlation. 
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Figure 32.  Correlated signal of normally distributed noise. 
 
Figure 33.  Correlated random noise spectrum. 
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2. Low Pass Filter (LPF) 
The cutoff frequency of the LPF is designed based on the maximum expected beat 
frequency. Since beat frequency is significantly below the radar frequency band, the LPF 
cutoff frequency sits low in the spectrum and leaves a narrow passband. This allows only 
a small fraction of the received noises to pass into the FFT stage. In the case of false 
target jamming, if the false target signal has a time delay that is greater than the expected 
delay at maximum detectable range, it will be filtered out by LPF and fail to produce a 
false alarm to the radar.  
3. Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) 
DFT has an inherent processing gain, which works similar to that of mixer 
correlation processing gain. Mathematically, DFT is defined as [13] 




#  (5.1) 
where  
X(m) = the mth DFT output component, i.e., X(0), X(1), X(2), X(3), etc.. 
m = the index of the DFT output in the frequency domain, m=0, 1, 2, 3,…,N !1, 
x(n) = the sequence of input samples, x(0), x(1), x(2), x(3),…, 
n = the time-domain index of the input samples, n=0, 1, 2, 3,…, N !1, 
N = the number of samples of the input sequence and the number of frequency points in 
the DFT output.  
The equation can be viewed as the signal x(n)  cross-correlating with the signal 
e! j2"nm/N  whose frequency is m . As noise spreads out over the frequency domain, the 
filter containing a target signal tone will have higher magnitude after FFT. 
Also worth mentioning is that when the number of DFT input N increases, the 
DFT’s output SNR will increase. This is because a DFT bin’s output noise standard 
deviation value is proportional to N , whereas the DFT’s output magnitude for the bin 
containing the signal tone is proportional to N [13]. That being said, with a longer 
modulation period, the signal advantage over random noise will become more significant.  
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4. GO-CFAR and Power Managing  
As with the GO-CFAR algorithm discussed previously, the signal amplitude 
detected at the test cell has to be multiple times (Tm ) the average amplitude at the 
reference cells in order to be declared as a target. For most CFAR threshold 
configurations, the PFA is suppressed below 10e! 6. This gives a high threshold value to 
avoid the environmental noise to cause a false alarm. With sufficient noise power, the 
noise floor can be raised to the extent that the calculated GO-CFAR threshold voltage 
surpasses the target magnitude. This will make the target invisible to the detector. 
However, the FMCW radar power managing system will increase the transmitter power 
until it reaches the desired SNR, and the target will be revealed again. 
Now that the FMCW radar DSP characteristics favoring the coherent waveform 
over others have been discussed, possible jamming strategies that work against FMCW 
radar are considered. The next section provides basic theories of radar jamming and later 
leads to what techniques may work against FMCW DSP. 
B. JAMMING APPROACH AND STRATEGIES 
1. Radar Jamming Overview 
The goal of radar jamming is to prevent the target echo signal from being 
correctly evaluated at the surveillance radar receiver, or in the case of tracking radar, to 
interrupt the tracking sequence and allow the target to break the lock. Jamming 
techniques generally fall into two major categories: deception jamming and noise 
jamming.  
Deception jamming transmits a manipulated signal that provides false target 
information, including false number of targets, false target range, speed and angle, to 
confuse the radar and affect its further action. Deception jamming can be effective 
against both surveillance radar and tracking radar. When used against surveillance radar, 
a deception-jamming system intercepts and stores the essential characteristics of the radar 
waveform, and then generates synthetic targets that are synchronized with the waveform 
pattern of the radar to create enough false targets to confuse the radar [14]. On the other 
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hand, when a radar tracking system locks on a target, the deception-jamming technique 
has the potential to break the lock by feeding the tracking circuit a synthetic target that 
substitutes the real target signal. 
The objective of noise jamming is to inject an interference signal into the enemy’s 
electronic equipment such that the actual signal is completely submerged by the 
interference [14]. Noise jamming waveforms have the advantage against search radar in 
that little needs to be known about the victim radar’s parameters except its frequency 
range [14]. When the jamming noise bandwidth is less than five times more than the 
signal bandwidth, it is called spot jamming; otherwise, it is barrage jamming. Compared 
to barrage jamming, spot jamming has higher power density since the jammer power is 
distributed over fewer frequency ranges, which makes it more efficient in interfering with 
the radar passband. Barrage jamming covers a wide range of bandwidth, which increases 
the possibility of covering the radar passband when the radar parameters are unknown. 
But the trade-off is the jamming efficiency due to low power density.  
2. FMCW Jamming Approach 
According to what was discussed in the previous section, for a jamming signal to 
affect detection results, it needs to overcome the correlation gain, low-pass filtering and 
DFT gain, and still retain sufficient noise power at the spectrum to cause false detection 
at the GO-CFAR detector. Having discussed the resistance to interference of the FMCW 
waveform, it would be interesting to investigate how both jamming approaches, 
deception and noise, can affect the FMCW DSP.  
a. Repeater Jamming 
An effective way of generating a deception signal is repeater jamming. A 
repeater jammer utilizes digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) technology to store the 
characteristics of the intercepted radar signal and retransmit that signal again to the 
victim radar. Such a jamming signal has the characteristics of the radar waveform and is 
coherent to the radar receiver. Due to coherency, a repeater jamming signal is able to 
obtain the same processing gain as the real radar signal would at the radar DSP instead of 
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being attenuated, and it eventually creates a strong beat frequency that will be detected as 
a false target by GO-CFAR.  
The false target behavior evaluated by the victim radar receiver can be 
manipulated by increasing jamming signal delay and center frequency, respectively. 
Knowing that the target range is proportional to the time delay of the echo signal, by 
adding more delay to the deception signal, the created false target will appear at a greater 
distance from the radar receiver. Furthermore, shifting the center frequency of the 
deception-jamming signal changes the differences between the beat frequencies ( fb1  and 
fb2 ) evaluated at the up-chirp and down-chirp sections. That being said, the range rate 
calculated by the radar computer will also change.  
Repeater jamming can be effective against both the reaching and tracking 
mode of an FMCW radar. If multiple replicated signals of various delays can be created, 
multiple false targets will appear at the victim radar spectrum and create confusion for the 
radar. Therefore, the possibility for the real target being detected will decrease. Often the 
deception signal has a higher signal power that would seduce the radar tracking circuits, 
which makes the jamming more effective. 
When the target is being locked on by the FMCW tracking mode, repeater 
jamming is capable of breaking lock by using a modified technique known as range-gate 
pull-off (RGPO). RGPO can be achieved by first making the amplified false target signal 
overlap the real target echo in the spectrum. When radar locks on the false target signal, it 
gradually increases the signal delay so the false target moves away from the real target. 
Once the radar tracking is pulled away with the false target to an extent, the jammer shuts 
off so the false target disappears. This interrupts the radar circuit and forces it to 
reacquire target.  
Repeater jamming can easily seduce the radar tracking when a false target 
signal has greater power than the real target return. The high target SNR may mislead the 
power managing system to decrease the transmitter power, submerging the real target 
signal into noise. Therefore, a repeater jammer usually amplifies the signal before 
transmitting. Theoretically, once the false target successfully seduces the tracking system, 
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RGPO can work effectively against both tracking approaches, fixed-beat frequency and 
fixed-modulation bandwidth, as mentioned in Chapter II. 
b. Noise Jamming 
Unlike repeater jamming, noise jamming waveforms are suppressed at the 
radar receiver and thus are less efficient. The examples given in Section A have shown 
that non-coherent jamming waveforms receive great attenuation at FMCW DSP 
components and only retain a little power at the detection phase. In order to efficiently 
distribute jammer power into the radar detector, the jammer must have a certain degree of 
knowledge of the victim radar band. The more one knows about the frequency range of 
the radar, the more efficiently one can jam it.  
Random noise waveforms are not efficient against FMCW radar. Since the 
jamming power is distributed across a wide range of frequencies of the FMCW frequency 
band, the power density is inherently small. For example, for a 150W jammer covering a 
15 MHz radar bandwidth (same as the simulation model), the power density is merely 0.1 
µW/Hz. With the effect of spreading loss and radar DSP, the power that reaches the 
GO-CFAR detector is minimal. Even if such energy is enough to reduce the SNR and 
temporarily affect detection, it would soon lose the edge once the radar power managing 
system increases the transmitter power. It is much more difficult for the jammer to 
increase the wideband noise power. When facing a wideband FMCW radar, a noise 
jammer has little chance to win the power race. This is also true for barrage jamming 
when the radar bandwidth is unknown.  
When the radar center frequency is known, an alternative way of 
delivering energy into the radar receiver is through a pulse waveform that transmits noise 
bursts about the radar’s center frequency. This compromised jamming waveform lacks 
the total effectiveness of the true repeater jammer and requires more knowledge of the 
victim radar than the true noise jammer [14]. However, the strong impulse injected into 
the radar’s processing interval may raise the noise floor to the extent that the target signal 
SNR becomes insufficient to be detected by GO-CFAR. Besides, since pulse jammers 
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have much higher peak power than CW radar, with sufficient PRF, it may overwhelm the 
radar signal spectrum. 
Another approach is to inject a complex sinusoid signal to the radar 
receiver. This technique is known as tone jamming. According to the principle of 
quadrature mixing, when multiplying a time series by the complex exponential e j2! fot , 
the signal’s spectrum is shifted upward in frequency by fo  Hz. It would be interesting to 
see how this effect can affect the radar detection. 
The MATLAB simulation of this project tests selective jamming 
techniques of both deception and noise jamming approaches. These techniques include 
repeater jamming, Gaussian pulse jamming and carrier-tone jamming. The following 
section introduces the jamming signal models. 
C. JAMMING SIGNAL MODEL  
1. Repeater Jamming 
Repeater jamming waveform has the characteristics of and is coherent with the 
FMCW radar waveforms. Therefore, the jamming signal is generated using the same 
algorithm as the received signal model except with higher signal power and additional 
time delay. To perform RGPO, the false target should first be placed as close to the real 
target range as possible to seduce the radar tracking, and then walk off the tracking 
system by increasing the time delay. The additional time delay that is needed for the false 
target to move up one range bin is 
 td _ j =
!R '
c   (5.2) 
where !R'  is the radar range bin size and c  is the speed of light. Given that the range 
resolution of the radar is 12.5m, td _ j  is calculated as 42 ns. That is, the false target will 
shift up by one range bin if additional 42 ns are added to the received radar signal. The 
simulation will run several times using different delays to observe the movement of the 
false signal relative to the real target. 
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Velocity deception can be created by shifting the signal center frequency. Given 
that the ship has ground speed of zero, the desired false velocity is, say, 15 m/s moving 
away from the missile. This false velocity can be injected by shifting down the signal 
carrier frequency by the corresponding Doppler frequency, such that from the victim 
radar’s point of view, the false target is approaching at a speed slower than real target. 
Repeater jammers amplify the jamming signal before retransmitting. In this 
model, the jammer power is determined by adding an additional 10 dBW to the 
intercepted signal power. The radar signal power at intercept receiver is calculated as the 
radar power with spreading loss 
 Pjr (dB) = Pt (dB)+G +Gi ! 32 ! 20 log(F)! 20 log(d)   (5.3) 
where Pt (dB)  is the radar signal power at the transmitter; G  is the gain of radar antenna; 
Gi  is the antenna gain of the intercept receiver; F  is the radar carrier frequency (MHz) 
and d  is the range to target (km). 
The jammer power is 10 dBW higher than the intercepted signal power, as 
 Pj (dB) = Pjr (dB)+10   (5.4) 
Similarly, by adding one-way spreading loss, the jamming signal power at the radar 
receiver can then be calculated as 
 Prj (dB) = Pj (dB)+Gj +G ! 32 ! 20 log(F)! 20 log(d)    (5.5) 
Under the same ASCM scenario in Chapter IV, the simulation parameters are 
computed and summarized in Table 9. 
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Table 9.   Repeater jamming model parameter. 
Jammer power  Pj   1.7e! 5 W 
Jamming Power at Receiver Prj   2.77e! 12 W 
Carrier frequency fc   4 GHz 
Modulation period tm   1.0 ms 
Coherent processing interval to   800 µ s 
Effective modulation bandwidth !F '   12 MHz 
Applied signal delay   t false   50-500 ns 
Applied doppler shift  fdshift   ! 400 Hz 
 
2. Gaussian Pulse Jamming 
The pulse-jamming model generates a Gaussian pulse train using the built-in 
MATLAB functions pulstran and gauspuls. This Gaussian pulse function is able to 
generate a band-limited pulse signal according to a specified center-frequency and 
bandwidth. The pulse signal has a center frequency of 4 GHz. Assuming the radar 
bandwidth is unknown to the jammer, the jammer bandwidth is set at 200 MHz. The peak 
power of the pulse is arbitrarily chosen as 15W. The PRI is chosen to be 0.0005 seconds, 
which makes five pulses in a modulation period. Table 10 lists the parameter of the 
Gaussian pulse jamming model. The produced pulse waveform is illustrated in Figure 34. 
Table 10.   Gaussian pulse jamming model parameter. 
Pulse peak power   15 W 
Jamming Power at the Received 2.44e! 6 W 
PRI 0.2 ms 
Center Frequency 4 GHz 
Signal Bandwidth 200 MHz 
 62 
 
Figure 34.  Gaussian pulse jamming waveform. 
3. Tone Jamming 
The tone jamming signal is a complex sinusoid waveform generated using the 
dsp.SineWave object and step function. The frequency of the sine wave is set at the radar 
center frequency, 4 GHz, for the best result. The power of the signal is arbitrarily 5W, 
which is only half of the emitter power.  
D. SIMULATION RESULT 
1. Repeater Jamming 
Recall the ASCM scenario mentioned in Chapter IV. Having detected the missile 
FMCW waveform, the warship deploys repeater jamming to the missile receiver at 
distance of 21 km. In the MATLAB simulation, the jamming signal generated from the 
repeater jamming model is applied to the existing radar model. Figure 35 depicts the 
radar magnitude spectrum with the presence of the false target signal of 50 ns delay.  
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Figure 35.  Radar Magnitude Spectrum with false target (50 ns shift). 
In Figure 35, the false target signal appears at the filter that is one bin up from the 
real signal. Since the real target signal has less magnitude than the false target signal, it is 
buried in false target sidelobes. In GO-CFAR detection, the false target signals are 
successfully detected at 2,092,891 Hz for up-chirp period and 2,107,588 Hz for down-
chirp period, leaving the real signal undetected. This indicates that the FMCW radar will 
acquire and lock on the false target instead of the real target. The range and range rate are 
calculated using (2.22) and (2.23), giving the result of 21,002.39m and 275.57 m/s. Given 
that the actual range is at 21,000m and ship velocity is zero, the calculated range and ship 
velocity is 2.39m and 12.27 m/s respectively. The result indicates that the repeater 
jamming technique has successfully injected a false target that appears to be located at 
further range and is moving away from the missile. 
As the missile approaches the warship to a close range, the warship deploys 
RGPO technique in order to avoid missile strike. Given that the missile is locked on to 
the false target, the warship can walk off the seeker lock by increasing the repeater delay. 
Figure 36 is the jamming result of 500 ns repeater delay time when the missile is 1,200 
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meters from the warship. It can be observed that with increased repeater delay, the false 
target is move out from the real target position. With higher SNR than the real target 
signal, the false target is detected by GO-CFAR at 119,783 Hz and 134,480 Hz, whereas 
the real target is ignored. The computed false target range and range rate is 1,271m and 
276 m/s. This result suggests a range error of 71 meters and range rate error of 24.43 m/s. 
In case of real world application, the repeater jammer will shut off at this time, forcing 
the seeker to return to search mode.  The simulation simply demonstrates the false target 
pull-off effect in the spectrum. Chapter VI will discuss the real-world application 
thoroughly. 
 
Figure 36.  Radar Magnitude Spectrum with false target (500 ns shift). 
2. Gaussian Pulse Jamming 
The pulse-jamming signal successfully raised the noise floor and decreased the 
signal-to-noise ratio enough to deny target detection. Although the noise does not bury 
the signal completely, its power level was able to build up the GO-CFAR threshold 
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voltage to surpass the target signal (Figure 37). Remember that the peak power of the 
pulse waveform is merely 15W, which is a moderate assumption for a pulse jammer. The 
pulse jamming waveform can fight against the FMCW power managing by increasing 
pulse power or PRF.  
 
Figure 37.  Gaussian pulse jammed spectrum. 
3. Tone Jamming 
The tone-jamming signal successfully raised the noise floor and completely 
buried the target signal for both up-chirp and down-chirp periods, as shown in Figure 38. 
Compared to pulse jamming, the tone signal can completely overwhelm the receiver with 
much less power. The fact that the 5W jamming signal is able to overwhelm a 10W radar 
makes it very efficient. Also, with the one-way propagation advantage, it is easier for the 
jammer to increase power against FMCW emitter power management. However, the 
specific simulation result does not reflect the real-world case.  
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Figure 38.  Tone-jammed spectrum. 
After reconsidering the principle of digital signal processing, it is found that the 
significant noise depicted in Figure 38 is a result of a special condition in the simulation 
model. Again, from the quadrature mixing principle, when a signal x(n)  is multiplied by 
a complex sinusoid signal ei2! fonts , the signal is shifted up by fo  in the frequency domain 
[13]. Therefore, when the reference signal is mixed with the 4 GHz tone, it is shifted up 
by 4 GHz in frequency domain. However, in discrete spectrum, for a band-pass signal 
located at fo  in the spectrum, a replication can be found at frequencies fo + kfs  [13], as 
shown in Figure 39(a). In this simulation model, since the sampling frequency (8 GHz) 
happen to be twice as much as the carrier frequency (4 GHz). When the reference signal 
is moved up from 4 GHz to 8 GHz, a DSP replica is also moved up from ! 4 GHz to 0 
GHz. This shifting centers the alias to the baseband, where the signal is then processed by 
the radar model and causes significant noise effect. Figure 39(b) depicts such 
characteristics of the discrete spectrum. In the real-world application where mixing is 
implemented in continuous spectrum, aliases do not exist. In such case the correlated 
signal is shifted up and filtered out by the low-pass filter and creates no jamming effects.  
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Figure 39.  Discrete spectrum aliasing of (a) original bandpass signal (b) signal after 
quadrature mixing with e j2! fot . 
E. SUMMARY 
The simulation model demonstrated the jamming effect of deception jamming and 
denial jamming against FMCW radar. By transmitting a signal that is coherent to the 
radar waveform, the jammer can successfully penetrate the radar signal processing 
mechanism and create a strong false target at the radar spectrum. The false target can 
confuse the missile seeker at the searching phase. With proper adjustment of jamming 
signal delay and frequency, the ship can execute RGPO, where the false target can 
substitute seeker lock-on and walk it off from the real target. By turning off the jammer 
temporarily, the seeker is forced to switch back to search mode and restart a searching 
sequence, which provides time for the ship to execute protective measures (i.e., 
maneuvering, chaff cloud). In modern electronic warfare, repeater jamming is carried out 
using DRFM technology. Chapter VI provides more discussions on the application side 
of the study. 
For noise jamming, both Gaussian pulse and single tone jamming are tested and 
compared for efficiency. As expected, the pulse jamming signal receives significant 
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attenuation at receiver DSP, but the strong impulse injected to the radar passband was 
sufficient to decrease the target SNR and avoid GO-CFAR detection. With the advantage 
of one-way propagation and stronger jammer power, pulse jamming has the potential to 
defeat the power managing system of FMCW radar and overwhelm the radar receiver. 
The key for implementing pulse jamming is that the impulse must cover the radar 
passband; otherwise it will cause no interference to the radar detection. 
On the other hand, tone jamming overwhelmed the receiver and denied detection 
in the simulation. The effectiveness of tone jamming is due to alias signal shifting in the 
digital quadrature mixing process. It is not feasible in real-world applications.  
In conclusion, when the parameters of FMCW radar signal can be determined, 
repeater jamming is effective against both radar searching and tracking modes. In cases 
when only radar carrier frequency is available, a pulse-jamming signal targeting the radar 
frequency band can inject strong impulse to the receiver and reduce SNR.  
Using the MATLAB model, we observed how a standard FMCW DSP would 
respond to different types of jamming signals. However, in real-world EW applications, 
many factors need to be considered besides the standard FMCW DSP discussed above. 
For example, modern radar systems implement several DSP algorithms that help identify 
real targets from false targets, as well as locating noise jammers for counter-attack. 
Chapter VI discusses these important issues and concerns that may affect FMCW 
jamming effectiveness.  
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VI. FMCW SIGNAL JAMMING IN REAL-WORLD EW 
SCENARIO 
The MATLAB simulation results suggest that repeater jamming and band-limited 
pulse jamming can both be effective against the FMCW waveform. However, another 
great challenge of electronic attack against FMCW radars is to detect, identify and 
classify modern LPI radars. The LPI nature of FMCW radars makes it difficult for the 
opponent to be aware of the existence of LPI transmissions. Also, modern LPI radars use 
very complicated modulation algorithms to prevent detection and jamming. Thus, the 
jammer architecture has to be much more complex and capable in order to handle such 
complicated modulations. Lastly, many radars implement EP measures that can 
significantly reduce the effectiveness of repeater and noise jamming.  
This chapter discusses the requirements of implementing repeater jamming and 
band-limited noise jamming, as well as some radar algorithms that are problematic to 
both jamming techniques. Also discussed are the challenges to modern EA systems from 
LPI emitters, before leading to a brief overview of the trends in EA system development. 
A. JAMMER ARCHTECTURE REQUIREMENTS  
1. Repeater Jamming  
a. Wide-Bandwidth Signal Processing 
The effectiveness of repeater jamming highly depends on the DRFM 
architecture of the EA jammer. DRFM memorizes the intercepted waveform 
characteristics and applies different deception techniques before retransmitting to the 
victim radar from which the intercepted signal was transmitted. However, when dealing 
with wideband radar, such as FMCW, the ADC clock speed and DRFM bandwidth must 
be sufficient so the intercepted wideband signal can be properly sampled and registered 
to the digital memory. If the input signal bandwidth is greater than DRFM bandwidth, the 
reconstructed signal would have errors that affect jamming efficiency. Techniques such 
as series-parallel sampling and shift register can help increase DRFM bandwidth using 
low-speed memory components without losing signal resolution [14]. Series-parallel 
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sampling (Figure 40) employs a tapped delay line, with taps at !t = 1 fs , such that 
multiple sample points can be taken simultaneously. For example, if five taps (five 
ADCs) are employed, a 500-MHz DRFM can needs to have circuitry that operates at only 
100 MHz while maintaining high resolution (bits of ADC). The drawback is the hardware 
complexity.  
 
Figure 40.  Series-parallel sampling technique (from [14]). 
Another technique that allows lower component bandwidth is the shift 
register technique. This technique employs a multiple-bit ADC to reduce the required 
memory speed. For an eight-bit ADC, as shown in Figure 41, the required memory clock 
is reduced by a factor of eight. In such a case a 100 MHz signal at the ADC output can be 
stored in a one-bit DRFM clocked at 12.5 MHz. The series-parallel sampling technique 
and the shift register technique can be implemented together to process a wide-bandwidth 




Figure 41.  Shift register technique for series-parallel conversion (from [14]). 
b. Knowledge of Adversary 
To deploy repeater jamming, the waveform data of the intercepted signal 
must be available in the EA system database. Figure 42 depicts the architecture of an 
advanced DRFM system. Notice that the techniques generator is what determines the 
modulation parameters of the jamming signal. The techniques generator is designed to 
apply a variety of RF techniques, including RGPO and VGPO against pulsed CW and 
pulsed Doppler threats. It samples the RF environment and then compares it against a 
threat library to match specific threat identification to the received environment [14]. 
Without required signal data in the system library for referencing, the technique generator 
cannot apply proper modulation to the repeater waveform, thus the effectiveness of 
repeater jamming is significantly degraded. The EA system would be forced to use a 





Figure 42.  Advanced DRFM architecture (after [14]). 
2. Band-Limited Noise Jamming 
Band-limited noise jamming can be achieved by using frequency modulation to 
bring a baseband signal and proper carrier frequency to cover the desired frequency 
range. With higher PRF and high pulse power, more energy can be injected to the radar 
processing interval and overwhelm the receiver. Noise jammer architecture is less 
complicated when compared with that of a deception jammer and requires less 
knowledge about the victim radar. However, the jammer must have knowledge about the 
victim radar bandwidth in order to efficiently distribute the jamming power over a 
targeted frequency range, as the energy delivered outside the radar receiver band is 
wasted.  
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B. ELECTRONIC PROTECTION MEASURES OF FMCW RADAR 
1. Home-on-Jam 
Many modern missiles implement two tracking methods:  a target tracking emitter 
and a passive anti-radiation seeker. This is effective especially against noise jamming. In 
general, when being jamming by a noise jammer, the victim radar can obtain a general 
direction of the jamming source using jamming strobes [14]. This is especially true with 
LPI radar due to low sidelobes, which give a higher angular resolution. A missile system 
with home-on-jam (or track-on-jam) capability can track on the noise source and destroy 
the jammer. Therefore, a noise jammer is vulnerable when facing a home-on-jam capable 
FMCW emitter.  
2. Doppler Cross-Referencing 
Modern tracking radars equipped with Doppler functionality cross-reference the 
calculated target speed with detected target position. A Doppler tracking radar follows 
the target by using the evaluated target velocity and position to predict the new target 
position at the next sweep. When a target position and velocity do not match over time, 
the radar will evaluate it as clutter or a false target and reject the track. Therefore, for 
repeater jamming conducting both RGPO and VGPO, it is important for the jammer to 
produce a consonant false target result to successfully deceive the radar.  
3. Impulse Protection Circuit 
Given the victim radar parameters, a radar pulse may inject overwhelming energy 
into the radar receiver band. Sufficient energy may burn the radar’s circuits and disable 
the radar completely. An impulse protection circuit implementing varistors can suppress 
surge power and prevent damage of the radar receiver.  
4. Leading Edge Tracker 
In many radar seeker designs, especially for surface-to-air missile (SAM) 
systems, tracking algorithms that prioritize closing targets are implemented. Such radar 
systems give the closest target an additional voltage gain when multiple targets are 
detected. This raises the required JSR for an RGPO attack to be effective. It also limits 
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the possible dynamic range of the delay time that can be added to RGPO. In order to 
prevent the turn-around time from being too long and allow the leading aircraft to be 
prioritized, repeater jammers must have very short turn-around times (on the order of 50-
100 ns) to minimize the probability of leading edge range trackers rejecting the deceptive 
signal [14]. This constraint limits deception range to below 30 meters.  
C. CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS TO ELECTRONIC ATTACK 
AGAINST FMCW 
1. LPI Detection, Identification and Classification 
What was not shown in the simulation was the ES phase of electronic warfare. 
Electronic Support Measures (ESM) involving LPI signal detection, identification and 
classification is what provides the information required for decision making in EW 
against FMCW radar. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) including signal modulation 
parameters can be derived from spectral analysis and is critical to optimize the 
effectiveness of an EA operation. The wideband and coherent features of FMCW 
waveforms allow the radar to operate in a noisy environment with very low power. In a 
congested EW environment where many electromagnetic signals exist, detecting FMCW 
signal becomes a great challenge to ES systems. In the most extreme case when the ESM 
fail to detect the LPI transmission, the necessary EA measure is never implemented.  
To reveal LPI signals in radio spectrum, Modern ES system implements Wigner-
Ville Distribution, Choi-Williams Distribution, Quadrature Mirror Filtering and 
Cyclostationary Spectral Analysis for the ELINT operators to visualize the signal 
parameters in time-versus-frequency domain. However, since the transmission of other 
emitters and noise affects the visibility of the signal of interest, sufficient battlefield 
intelligence, such as target type, capability, location or mission can help the ELINT 
operators’ judgment and confidence in the interpreting process, hence increase the 
possibility of a successful EA operation.  
2. Complexity of Hardware 
For an LPI system in which multiple modes can be chosen, the complexity of the 
intercept and classification problem for the EW receiver is increased, necessarily 
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increasing the complexity of the system. For large platforms such as warships, EW 
systems that integrate an intercept receiver and complex jammer system are available. 
However, in the case of suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) operations, in which 
proper EA must be provided to blind adversary radar systems and, if failed, the incoming 
missiles, the capability of onboard jammers is typically limited. To compensate for the 
reduced ability of single platforms, a network-centric operation using cooperating 
sensors, jammers and shooters is optimum.  
3. Look-Through  
In EA operations, observation of emitter response to the jamming signal is 
needed. An EA system “listens” to the victim radar to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
interference so it can adjust jamming strategies accordingly. In self-screen jamming, this 
causes an unavoidable look-through, where the jammer pauses for a short period of time 
to allow radar-warning receiver (RWR) to listen to the victim radar. Look-through affects 
jamming efficiency since it reduces the jamming signal dwell time and gives the radar an 
opportunity to acquire the target during look-through. For an EA system, the look-
through has to be less than the time required for the radar to reacquire a target. Ideally, 
any amount of look-through is unwanted [1]. 
In a network-centric operation, jammer look-through can be eliminated as 
jamming and listening are carried out by different platforms. In such cases, the jammer 
can continuously deliver jamming power and observe the victim radar response using the 
information provided by the sensor network. 
4. Multiple Target Jamming 
In the modern battlefield, where multiple enemy emitters are present, a jammer 
that is capable of jamming multiple targets simultaneously is desired. Such EA systems 
require much power to inject energy into the various channels at which the target radars 
operate. Therefore, once again, besides the output power of the jammer, the knowledge 
for the victim emitters is very important to execute multiple-target jamming efficiently.  
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5. Network-Centric Electronic Warfare Requirement 
In network-centric electronic warfare, the EW receivers must be able to 
disseminate all onboard detections in real time. Such capability is sometimes referred to 
as real-time out of the cockpit (RTOC) [1]. On the other hand, the ability to accept real 
time data is known as real-time data in the cockpit (RTIC). RTOC and RTIC are critical 
in a network-centric architecture in order to share and process information in real time 
among sensors and shooters. This requires a wideband RF transmit and receive capability 
of all participant platforms. Also, a wideband local network is required for each platform 
to process large amounts of information internally [1].  
To best benefit from the network-centric architecture, the design of the network, 
including the numbers of platforms required, balance between sensors and shooters, and 
optimal topology to be deployed, needs to be carefully evaluated for different scenarios. 
With the possible presence of enemy EA, the network tolerance and EP measures against 
electronic interference also need to be considered. The concept of network-centric 
architecture is as depicted in Figure 43. 
 
Figure 43.  Network-centric architecture countering LPI emitter (from [1]). 
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D. TREND OF EA DEVELOPMENT  
The trend of modern EA systems is network-centric architecture, where multiple 
sensors and shooters are incorporated under the command of a decision maker. Besides 
eliminating the jammer look-through as discussed previously, the network-centric 
architecture can utilize multiple sensors (EW receivers) to improve LPI detection. A 
sensor-network architecture, known as swarm intelligence technology, is a major 
approach for collecting the trace of an LPI emitter in modern EW. Swarm technology 
allows sharing of information among multiple sensors, thus the detections from each 
individual sensor are collected and evaluated as a group. This gives a higher probability 
of identifying LPI waveforms in a complex modern EW environment and provides the 
necessary information for EA measures. Swarm technology makes it possible to deploy 
stand-in UAVs to collect LPI emitter characteristics in enemy territories and share the 
collected intelligence to the decision maker and shooters for upcoming or ongoing EA 
operations.  
As discussed previously, the key to an effective network-centric architecture is the 
speed with which information can be shared and processed across the network. Also, high 
sensitivity improves the intercept receivers’ capability to identify LPI waveforms. The 
future digital receiver will incorporate optical technologies for speed and bandwidth, and 
will also incorporate high-temperature superconductors for sensitivity [1].  
Specific emitter identification (SEI) technology that fingerprints the intercepted 
LPI emitter is currently under development. SEI can also be used for improved tracking 
and de-interleaving according to [1]. An EA system that implements SEI technology can 
have significant impact on LPI radar jamming. 
E. SUMMARY 
Intelligence is the key to the success of an EA operation. The development of EA 
and EP is the history of a tug-of-war. For every radar system there are jamming 
techniques that counter it. On the other hand, with the debut of new EA technologies, a 
corresponding EP measure is also developed. In Chapter V, it has been shown that band-
limited pulse jamming and repeater jamming can work against FMCW radars. However, 
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most tracking radars nowadays are equipped with a home-on-jam capability that tracks on 
a noise source and makes the noise jammer vulnerable to such an emitter. Repeater 
jamming is effective against FMCW radars, but the LPI nature of FMCW makes it 
difficult for the target to be aware of the incoming threat. Radar algorithms such as 
leading edge tracking and Doppler cross-referencing also limit the effectiveness of 
repeater jamming. That being said, the intelligence provided by ES systems is just as 
important as the capability of EA system in an EA operation. The earlier enemy systems 
and characteristics can be identified, the more effective are the measures that can be 
conducted against them.  
According to [15], FMCW radar incorporating a frequency hopping spread 
spectrum (FHSS) technique is currently under development. Such a system has the merits 
of FMCW radar as well as the agility of a frequency hopping system, and will once again 
challenge the current ES and EA technologies. To operate against a FMCW-FHSS 
system, the need for repeater jammer incorporating smart jamming techniques can be 
expected. As new technology being developed overtime, the race of ES and EA against 
emitter EP technologies will continue.  
The next chapter concludes the thesis project. The results from both LVRTS 
experiment and MATLAB simulation are summarized. A brief discussion on modifying 
the simulation model for extended testing is also provided. In order to enhance the 
effectiveness of overall EA operation against FMCW radar, future studies on improving 




To study the subject of FMCW radar jamming, this research has taken three 
different approaches, including theoretical studies, hardware experiment and computer 
simulation. From the collective result of all three approaches, the thesis project can offer 
these conclusions: 
As other studies suggested, FMCW radar DSP is unable to distinguish between 
the real radar echo signal and a jamming signal with identical modulation. In such case, 
the jamming signal receives the radar processing gain, which allows it to penetrate radar 
DSP and alter the detection result. This makes FMCW radar vulnerable to repeater 
jamming. Repeater jammer requires the victim radar parameters be available in the 
system database. So when the radar signal is detected, the DRFM technique generator has 
sufficient knowledge of the waveform to apply proper delay and Doppler shift. With 
proper design of the modulation parameters, a realistic false target that is capable of 
seducing both the radar range gate (RGPO) and velocity gate (VGPO) can be generated. 
With sufficient PRF, the energy impulse provided by pulse jamming signal can 
significantly increase the JSR, given that the jamming bandwidth covers the radar 
passband. Since pulse jamming is non-coherent to the radar receiver, it receives much 
attenuation at the receiver DSP. Theoretically, the amount of attenuation depends on the 
modulation waveform of the pulse signal. If the jamming signal chirp rate is somewhat 
similar to the radar waveform, the jamming signal receives less attenuation, make EA 
more effective. The attenuation can be compensated by high jamming power if available. 
On the operation side, pulse jamming is a good option when radar passband is somewhat 
known. Pulse jamming also has the potential to “fry” the radar receiver circuit with a 
strong impulse. However, it is unlikely to happen to modern radar systems, as impulse 
protection circuits are usually implemented. Meanwhile, the modern missile seeker 
equipped with anti-radiation capability also reduces the effectiveness of noise jamming 
techniques.  
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Although the example in Chapter V suggests that random noise receives the most 
attenuation at radar mixer output, obvious jamming effect was observed in the LVRTS 
experiment. The result proves that the band-limited random noise jamming can also be 
effective against FMCW radar systems if the noise bandwidth is limited within the radar 
passband. As the noise energy injected to the radar receiver is the product of the noise 
power density and receiver bandwidth, the maximal jamming effect occurs when the 
noise bandwidth is equal to the receiver bandwidth. But when compared with other 
jamming techniques, it is not power efficient. However, when the radar operation 
frequency band is unknown, a broad-band random noise waveform may be the only 
option. As with the pulse jamming waveform, the noise waveform can attract anti-
radiation seekers and jeopardize the EA system. 
From the discussion above, it can be concluded that the effectiveness of jamming 
techniques highly depends on the information about the radar system available to the 
jammer. However, acquiring FMCW emitter parameters is difficult in the real-world EW 
scenario. The LPI characteristics allow the FMCW radar to operate below environment 
noise, especially in a battlefield, where radio spectrum is congested with signals of radars 
and communication systems from both friends and foes. As the amount of information 
that can be obtained by the ELINT operator determines the EA techniques to be deployed, 
battlefield intelligence providing enemy platform information becomes the key to a 
successful EA operation. Knowing the position, capability and mission of the victim 
emitter, an ELINT operator is more likely to extract suspicious signals among clutters, 
and possibly identify the parameters of the signal to be jammed. The network-centric EW 
operation is the modern approach for enhanced intelligence acquiring as well as 
command and control. In such case, information is exchanged and shared among sensors, 
shooters and commander via wideband network in a timely manner. The network-centric 
operation allows deployment of multiple UAVs to cover a wide-range of battlefield for 
intelligence. The collected data can then be analyzed for possible EA operation. 
The simulation model of this research has the potential to be modified for more 
complicated testing. For example, by adding radar scan pattern and Markov Chain 
functions, a three-dimensional radar model can be constructed. In such case, the effect of 
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jamming signals to the target angle can be examined. Furthermore, a more complex EW 
scenario including factors of multiple targets, environment clutter and meteorology can 
also be modeled for more realistic simulation. 
As this research has investigated the jamming phase of EA operation against 
FMCW, future studies on improving ELINT capability in identifying LPI radar is 
suggested. In LPI signal analysis, Wigner-Ville Distribution, Choi-Williams Distribution, 
Quadrature Mirror Filtering and Cyclostationary Spectral Analysis are popular algorithms 
that are implemented in modern ES system to visualize the signal parameters in time-
versus-frequency domain. However, when an LPI transmission is intercepted, the radar 
parameter is interpreted and cross-referenced visually by ELINT operators among 
different algorithms. The efficiency of this process highly depends on the skill and 
experience of the ELINT operators. In modern warfare where time and precision are 
critical factors, a poor ELINT operator can not only reduce EA effectiveness, but also 
endanger entire operation. Therefore, a computer algorithm that can automatically and 
accurately interpret the signal parameters can significantly improve the signal 
identification and classification process hence benefits the entire EA operation. 
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